The Security Information Service Annual Report for 2024 highlights ongoing threats from Russia and China. According to Czech counterintelligence, the risks are primarily concentrated in the areas of influence operations, cybernetics, and sanctions evasion. Intelligence officers also warn against new methods used by hostile actors, such as the recruitment of so-called “telegram agents”, and point to a disturbing trend of radicalization among young people in the online environment.

The Security Information Service, known by the acronym “BIS” (in Czech: Bezpečnostní informační služba”), is a counterintelligence service operating in the Czech Republic. Its main task is to protect the state from espionage and other hostile activities by foreign powers or organizations. The activities, status, and powers of the BIS are regulated by the Czech Intelligence Services Act and the Security Information Service Act.

Russia as a Persistent Threat

According to the BIS Annual Report, the influence of the Russian Federation continues to pose a risk to the Czech Republic, as it has in previous years. Its goal is to destabilize EU countries and undermine trust in the institutions on which democratic society is based. An example of Russian activities on Czech territory is the work of Belarusian citizen Natallia Sudliankova. She lived in the Czech Republic for a long time as an asylum seeker and devoted herself to journalism aimed at the Russian-speaking audience.

When Russian entities were excluded from the tender for the completion of the Dukovany nuclear power plant in 2021, Sudliankova played a key role in promoting the interests of the Russian company Rosatom. In her articles, she also criticized Czech non-governmental organizations and the provision of aid to Ukraine. The journalist’s activities in this area were directed and financed by Alexei Shavrov, a member of the Russian military intelligence service GRU. In 2024, Natallia Sudliankova focused on the alleged illegality of EU sanctions imposed on Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov, who supports the war waged by Russia. Due to her activities, Natallia Sudliankova was added to the Czech national sanctions list in April 2025 and given 30 days to leave the country.

Recruitment on Telegram

One of Russia’s goals is to weaken European society’s cohesion on the issue of support for Ukraine. For this reason, Russia has come up with a new tactic and started hiring people who are not directly connected to the Russian state but are intended to carry out attacks on selected targets. Advertisements for such jobs, which most often appear on the Telegram social network, do not specify the type of work, but promise easy money. Such “Telegram agents” take photos and videos of sensitive objects, such as military bases or transshipment points for military aid to Ukraine, or commit arson attacks. There have been several incidents in the Czech Republic. One of them was the burning of a bus in the Klíčov depot in Prague. This attack was carried out by a Colombian citizen lured in by a financial reward, with Russia primarily targeting migrants from economically weaker countries in similar operations.

Evasion of Sanctions Against the Russian Federation

The year 2024 also confirmed the efforts of some Czech companies to circumvent sanctions against Russia. Despite Russia’s ongoing military aggression in Ukraine, some Czech companies tried to find ways to supply goods to the Russian Federation last year, despite the sanctions imposed.Most often, they used re-export via third parties. The BIS recorded a case of a Czech manufacturer who initially sent his goods, destined for Russia, to a country that is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, then to China, and only then did the goods reach Russia.

The BIS adds that the sanctions are not intended to completely isolate the Russian market, but rather to increase the cost of obtaining European goods. These must be transported covertly and via longer routes, which makes the whole process more expensive and complicates the expansion of Russian production capacities. Nevertheless, Moscow finds open support from China, Iran, and North Korea.

Radicalization of Young People on Social Media

In addition to foreign threats, the BIS also draws attention to an internal problem – the growing radicalization of young people in the online environment, which is closely related to the phenomenon of social networks. In 2024, the BIS recorded approximately two dozen individuals aged 13 to 21, predominantly boys of Czech nationality. Their radicalization manifested itself in searching for and disseminating Islamist or right-wing extremist material on the internet. A fascination with violence and a desire to be part of a community of like-minded individuals played a key role, while the ideology itself was secondary. Most of these individuals were socially isolated or came from complicated family backgrounds.

While radicalization often took place autonomously without direct links to radical organizations, the BIS also recorded a case of a 21-year-old Czech citizen who was in contact with Islamic State (IS) actors. The BIS also monitored a right-wing extremist group of young people who were inclined towards the ideas of militant accelerationism and SIEGE culture, which interprets fascism and National Socialism in the most extreme way. The greatest real risk was a call for a terrorist attack on the Pride march in Bratislava. The police took action against the group and initiated criminal proceedings against the main actor.

The inclination toward extremism is often linked to personal isolation, a lack of social ties, and a lack of interest from those around. Deradicalization is therefore possible through a multidisciplinary approach involving parents, schools, social services, and, in extreme cases, security forces. In this regard, the BIS encourages the public to report individuals exhibiting signs of risky behavior to the BIS via email at prevence@bis.cz.

Chinese Investment in Vlkoš, Moravia

Not only does the Russian Federation pose a security risk to the Czech Republic, but China does as well. One of the most jeopardizing activities of Chinese entities in Czechia was the investment by Emposat in the construction of a ground satellite station. The Chinese company Emposat, in cooperation with a Czech partner, put into operation a satellite antenna in the village of Vlkoš near Kyjov, intended for communication, control, and data collection from satellites over Central Europe. The goal of this investment was to establish communication with the Jilin satellite network, which is managed by the Chinese state-owned company Chang Guang Satellite Technology, now included on the EU and US sanctions lists for providing satellite images to the Russian Wagner Group, which operates in Ukraine.

Several security risks were identified during the project’s assessment. Chinese companies are legally obligated to cooperate with the Chinese state, which poses a real risk that the satellite equipment may be used for military or intelligence purposes. This is clearly contrary to Czech security and foreign policy interests. Risks were identified in the areas of image and signal intelligence, threats to signal communications, and cybersecurity.

The case met the definition of a risky foreign investment, and therefore, the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MPO) initiated a review process. Based on the identified risks, the Czech Telecommunications Office did not grant Emposat a license to use radio frequencies. At the end of 2024, the Emposat case was still being resolved. However, in May 2025, the satellite station was removed in accordance with the MPO’s decision, following a government resolution that prohibited the continuation of this investment. The BIS handled this case as the first of its kind in Czechia.

Conclusion

The year 2024 was marked by continuing and newly emerging threats, particularly from Eastern powers. In addition to traditional influence operations and cyberattacks, new forms of threats emerged, such as the recruitment of Telegram agents and attempts to control satellite infrastructure. The instrumentalization of artificial intelligence for disinformation campaigns and the growing radicalization of young people on social networks were also serious issues.

Translated by Kryštof Urban.

 

Sources

BIS. 2024. Annual Report of the Security Information Service for 2024. Available at: https://www.bis.cz/vyrocni-zpravy/vyrocni--zprava-bezpecnostni-informacni-sluzby-za-rok-2024-323084ca.html.

Lee, Ben. (2022). What is Siege Culture? Retrieved from: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/comment/what-is-siege-culture/